Marquette Law Review
Volume 23
Issue 4 June 1939

Article 5

The Representative Action as a Pleading Device
George Eggers

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/mulr
Part of the Law Commons
Repository Citation
George Eggers, The Representative Action as a Pleading Device, 23 Marq. L. Rev. 209 (1939).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/mulr/vol23/iss4/5

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Marquette Law Review by an authorized administrator of Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact
megan.obrien@marquette.edu.

1939]

NOTES

THE REPRESENTATIVE ACTION AS A PLEADING DEVICE
The causes underlying the adoption of the representative or class
action' are those which prompted the adoption of pleading codes in
code jurisdictions. The representative action is designed to simplify
litigation, to render the administration of justice more convenient for
parties and tribunal, and to eliminate a multiplicity of suits where the
rights and liabilities of numerous and similarly interested litigants may
be fairly adjudicated in a single action.
Use of the representative action is predicated in part upon the
existence of a number of parties plaintiff or defendant whose "common interest" in a controverted question is such as to constitute them
a "class" of litigants, which will be affected favorably or adversely in
the same manner by the judicial determinations to be made. When
numerous parties are so related by a "community of interest," an
action may be sued or defended by one or more representatives of
their class. Representatives and represented alike are generally bound
by the judgment or decree of the court. Section 260.12 of the Wisconsin statutes, in which provision is made for the use of the representative action, is typical of statutes found in code jurisdictions .
" . . . and when the question is one of a common or general
interest of many persons or when the parties are very numerous
and it may be impracticable to bring them all before the court,
one or more may sue or defend for the benefit of the whole."
It is important to note at the outset that the statute presents two
distinct, alternative situations, the presence of either of which satisfies
the statutory prerequisites. While the presence of both situations in
a single action is perhaps the rule rather than the exception, the language of the statute is unmistakably clear, i.e., the class action may be
employed either (A) when the question is one of common or general
interest of many persons or (B) when the parties are very numerous
and it may be impracticable to bring them all before the court. Some
writers view the statutory distinction between the two situations as
academic. Pomeroy, in commenting on the probability of situation
(B) above existing alone, stated: ". . . it is difficult to conceive of an
action in which a very large number of persons should be capable of
joining as plaintiffs-so large that it would be impracticable to bring
them all actually before the court-unless the question to be determined was one of common or general interest to all."-, Logical justification for the separation of the situations is not lacking, how"The terms "representative action" and "class action" are used indiscriminately
by the courts.
2
It is important that local statutes be consulted for variations.
3

PomFRoY, CoDE REmnrs (3rd Ed.), Section 389.
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ever, if viewed as meaning that when situation (A) is relied on alone
there must be numerous parties, but less parties than required in
situation (B) ; and that when reliance is on situation (B) alone, there
must be some degree of interest among the parties, but less than the
common interest required in situation (A).
The common or general interest required by the statute does not
admit of precise definition. The determination of the type of interest
which a number of parties plaintiff or defendant have in the subject
matter of a particular controversy is one of the most vexatious of
pleading problems. 4 Obviously, the ultimate explanation of so broad a
term in a legislative enactment as common interest is dependent upon
judicial construction. Courts have declared the use of the representative action to be proper and have found a common interest among
plaintiffs or defendants in the following types of action:
(1) By bondholders to foreclose a truft deed and to obtain the
appointment of a receiver.(2) By creditors of a defunct bank to enforce the statutory
liability of stockholders 6
(3) By retail dealers to restrain an illegal conspiracy among
wholesalers who combined to drive non-combination members out of
7
business.
(4) By stockholders of a dissolved corporation to recover on a
promissory note."
(5)
By heirs claiming title under a will to set aside a fraudulent
conveyanceY
(6) By taxpayers to restrain the collection of, or to recover, taxes
illegally assessed.
(7) By beneficiary to recover death benefits from an unincorporated association (trade union) insuring the lives of its members.,
2
(8) By legatees, entitled to separate benefits, to establish a will.:
4

compulsory joinder statutes, e.g., plaintiffs or defendants who are
Under
"united in
interest" must be joined. Other statutes' permit the voluntary

joinder of parties plaintiff or defendant who "have an interest in the subject
of the action and in obtaining the relief demanded." Space does not permit
a discussion of the differences between the "common or general interest" of
the class action statute and the various other types of "interest" mentioned
in pleading statutes.
5 Clay v. Selah Valley Irrigation Co., 14 Wash. 543, 45 Pac. 141 (1896).
6 Adams

v. Clark, 36 Col. 65, 85 Pac. 642 (1906) ; Gaiser v. Buck, 179 N.E. 1,
82 A.L.R. 1348 (1931); R. F. C. v. Central Republic T. Co., 11 F. Supp. 976

(1935).

71Hawarden v. Lehigh Coal Co., 111 Wis. 545, 87 N.W. 472 (1901).
s Marshall v. Wittig, 205 Wis. 510, 238 N.W. 390 (1931).
Thames v. Jones, 97 N.C. 121, 1 S.E. 692 (1887).
10 Commonwealth v. Scott, 112 Ky. 252, 65 S.W. 596 (1901).
11 Colt v. Hicks, 97 Ind. App. 177, 179 N.E. 335 (1932).
McKenzie v. L'Amoureux, 11 Barbour 516 (1851).
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(9) By trustees to recover trust funds."
(10)
By printing employers of a city to enjoin members of a
typographical union from conspiring to compel employers to accept a
closed shop.?4
(11) By creditors to obtain the appointment of successor trustees
of mortgage certificates issued by a guaranty company."
(12) By policy holders to enjoin the use of company funds."'
(13)
By negro children to restrain the enforcement of an order
prohibiting their participation in the social functions of a public
school? 7
(14) In partition proceedings of property held under a will (by
defendants).
The foregoing illustrations indicate that the representative action is
more adaptable to equitable than to purely legal proceedings. No distinction is made in the statute, however, between legal and equitable
proceedings, and the representative action is equally available in the
former upon compliance with the statutory requirements.
However, the propriety of permitting the use of the class action in
tort cases or in cases requiring the payment of money damages only is
doubtful. An interpretation of the term "common or general interest"
which would embrace the interest of one plaintiff in the money damages of another plaintiff would seem abortive, for, as stated in
Cavanagh v. Hutcheson,"" the accompanying practical difficulties in conducting such an action by representation would be substantial: "The
damages alleged are tort damages; there is no common or general
rule of damages that could be determined to suit the exigencies of the
case. There is no common factor by which an assessment of damages
could be given to a jury to consider. Instead of aiding this court in
avoiding a multiplicity of suits, it probably would increase such possibility."
Wheelock v. First Presbyterian Church, 119 Cal. 447, 51 Pac. 841 (1897).
14 Trade Press Pub. Co. v. Milw. Typo. Union, 180 Wis. 449, 193 N.W. 507
(1923).
15 Acken v. N. Y. Title & Mortgage Co., 9 Fed. Supp. 521 (D.C. N.D. New
York, 1934).
16 Supreme Tribe of Ben Hur v. Cauble, 255 U.S. 356, 41 Sup. Ct. 338, 65 L.ed.
673 (1921).
17 Jones v. Newlon, 81 Colo. 25, 253 Pac. 386, 50 A.L.R. 1263 (1927). In speaking
of the propriety of using the representative action in this instance, the court
remarked: "The wrong is done by entry and enforcement of the order made
and enforced against each of the plaintiffs by defendants in the same capacity,
injuring each of the plaintiffs in the same way, in violation of the same
Constitutional provision, and requiring the same judgment, i.e., the abrogation
of the order."
Is Coquillard v. Coquillard, 62 Ind. App. 426, 113 N.E. 474 (1916); Springs v.
Scott, 132 N.C. 548, 44 S.E. 116 (1903) ; Jordan v. Jordan, 145 Tenn. 378, 239
S.W. 423 (1922).
as250 N.Y. Supp. 127 (1931).
'2
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Whether the plaintiffs or defendants in a controversy are so very
numerous as to make it "impracticable to bring them all before the
court," is a question to be determined by the circumstances of the
particular case. Courts have consistently declined, and with wisdom,
to establish maximum or minimum numbers to govern the application
of this portion of the statute. Numerical considerations alone do not
always determine the impracticability of bringing numerous litigants
before the tribunal. The determination is obviously one which may
most fairly be left to the broad discretion of the trial court.
The interpretation of the statute by the Wisconsin Supreme Court
merits attention. In Newcomb v. Horton,O the court held the representative action to be inapplicable to an action brought by a taxpayer in
his own behalf and in behalf of other taxpayers of a school district
to restrain the country treasurer from selling their lands to collect a
delinquent tax. The tax was assessed to pay judgments against the
district. Plaintiffs alleged that the judgments had been obtained on
forged school orders and were void and illegal. The court held a
common or general interest among the plaintiffs to be wanting and
refused to permit the action to be brought as a representative action.
It seems difficult, however, to conceive of a case in which the use
of the representative action is more desirable. Ordinarily the question
of legality extends to the entire assessment, and each taxpayer has a
"common interest" in that question. It is not unusual, morever, that
the taxpayers affected by the same illegal act number in the several
thousands.2 '
The Wisconsin Court in the later decision of Carstens v. Fond du
Lac2 declared that the doctrine of the Newcomb case is limited to the
facts of that case and that it has no application to cases in which the
class action is employed by taxpayers to restrain the unlawful disposal
of public funds or the entry into unlawful contracts which require the
expenditure of public funds.
In Hodges v. Nalt3M a representative action by ten members of a
church congregation in their own behalf and in behalf of other subscribers (65) to a church building fund was held properly brought
against a defaulting subscriber. The basis of the decision was the
impracticability of bringing the seventy-five subscribers before the
20 18
21 In

Wis. 594 (1864).

Commonwealth v. Scott, supra note 10, the court, in commenting on the
probable consequences of a refusal to permit a class action to be brought by
taxpayers, said "Intolerable confusion, inequality in results, and vast opportunity for whimsical, ignorant, or tyrannical action affecting many of the
smaller interests would ensue . . . It is equally manifest that it is absolutely
impracticable to make all of these taxpayers parties plaintiff."
2' 137 Wis. 465, 119 N.W. 117 (1909).
23104 Wis. 464, 80 N.W. 726 (1899).
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court. The presence or absence of a common interest among the
plaintiffs was not discussed.
A class action was brought by ten printing employers of Milwaukee
to restrain members of a typographical union from carrying out an
illegal conspiracy designed to compel plaintiffs to accept a closed shop.
The court held, in Trade Press Pub. Co. v. Milw. Typo. Unson that
since the conspiracy was directed at the employers as a class rather
than as individuals, the question of the legality of defendants' conduct
was one of common or general interest to the employers. Similarly, it
was held in Hawarden v. Lehigh Coal Co. 5 that retail dealers who
sought to enjoin wholesalers from forcing them out of business through
an illegal combination had such a common interest in the question of
the legality of the combination as to permit the use of the class action.
GEORGE EGGFas.

4

note 14.
25 Supra, note 7
2 Supra,

